The maturing of the post-1965 children of immigrants and the emergence of immigrant settlement outside of traditional locations have implications for understanding immigrant economic incorporation. This analysis examines how changing immigrant geographies will affect the economic prospects of immigrants and a maturing second generation, and addresses sociological and economic perspectives on internal migration and immigrant progress. Using the 2000 5% PUMS, I employ endogenous switching regression models in analyzing the selectivity of internal migration and state residence patterns to the wages of immigrant, 1.5 generation, and US-born workers. Non-white immigrant and 1.5 generation workers evade racial wage penalties through migration, but not through residing in emerging immigrant states. Understanding the selectivity of internal migration to wages across racialized labor markets is important in assessing new immigrant geographies and prospects for the second generation.
Introduction
Two prominent issues have refocused some of the immigrant integration debate since 2000.
First, the dominance of top immigrant destinations like Los Angeles was reduced as immigrants increasingly settled in newer destinations, often without a history of immigrant concentrations. Second, the children of post-1965 immigrants began to reach working age in the 1990s and enter the labor force. These trends bring to the fore questions of geography and inequality with regard to debates on immigrant integration, as prospects for the second generation will depend upon their presence in the racially-structured labor markets they inherit from their parents and internal migration. (The same, of course, can be said of young workers of US-born parents.) In short, the prospects for intergenerational progress have much to do with the unequal contexts within which workers are situated -and yet these labor market contexts also have much to do with the changing populations in them. Will immigrants and their children have better relative wage prospects -relative to the US-born of US parents -as a result of internal migration? How does the selectivity of internal migration come into play in the 1990s? What will changing settlement patterns mean for 'catching up' to the wages of native-born workers?
In a series of wage selectivity models, I find that immigrants and the adult second generation manage to escape some racial wage penalties via internal migration. That said, they do not do so by locating in newly emerging immigrant states, which demonstrate considerable negative selectivity with regard to wages (even after controlling for local variations in housing value). Whether immigrant, 1.5 generation, or US-born, all non-whites garner lower wages in these locations relative to whites, and much lower returns to a university degree. There are interesting intergenerational and gendered patterns in these wage selectivity models as well. I suggest further that we need to reconsider discussions of positively-selected migration and spatial assimilation to account for the fact that some migrants may be moving in order to evade disadvantages in unequal local labour markets.
Further, given the negative selectivity to newer immigrant locations for even the US-born, these models suggest that 1990s labor market growth in the US might be evidence of increasing regional inequalities as well as individual mobility.
Theoretical and Empirical Background
By the mid-1990s immigration scholars across disciplines had turned their attention to the ways in which immigrant geographies were likely to matter for their prospects of both social and economic incorporation. The 1990 census still showed immigrants concentrated overwhelmingly in a few key immigrant metropolises, and Roger Waldinger's 2001 edited volume Strangers at the Gates framed discussions of immigrant progress across multiple dimensions in just five immigrant cities (New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, and Miami). This set the stage for a continuing focus on the importance of the differing geographies of immigrants and natives -specifically with regard to the largely deleterious effects of high levels of inequality and segregation alongside highly-concentrated immigrant settlement. Geographers were quick to point out that much of the immigrant-native wage gap was an artifact of disproportionate immigrant presence in the most extremely polarized labor markets (Clark 2001 , Ellis 2001 , and sociologists sought to allay concerns surrounding concentrations of "unassimilable" immigrants with the suggestion that immigrant education and mature job networks in immigrant cities provided substantial assets for integration and mobility into the middle class "mainstream" (Zhou 2001, Waldinger and Feliciano 2004) .
But the focus on a handful of immigrant cities and states and concern with immigrant concentrations therein only intensified as the first of the second generation children of post-1965 immigrants began to enter the labor market in the 1990s. Questions of intergenerational immigrant geographies were posed early -perhaps too early in retrospect -and certainly before many of this population were visible as adults in the data.
The spatial assimilation perspectives that link assimilation with dispersion from immigrant concentrations have always provided theoretical undergirding for questions of immigrant settlement and mobility, so it was no surprise that they resurfaced with regard to the nearly adult second generation. How would the children of immigrants fare as they entered the labor force in the same concentrated immigrant cities and states that had often imperiled their parents? Would their parents' presence in places like Los Angeles hinder their chances of entering the economic and social "mainstream"? Would ethnic concentration persist intergenerationally and result in super-segregation and a segmented foreign-stock underclass?
As it turns out, signs mount that we need not have worried quite so fervently. As geographers hastened to argue that spatial assimilation had been inappropriately scaled-up from the ghetto to the metropolis to the state (Ellis and Goodwin-White 2006) , and sociologists that immigrant metropolises could bear (and had borne) stories of intergenerational social mobility as well as segmented downward assimilation (Zhou and Logan 1989 , Logan, Alba and McNulty 1994 , Waldinger 1996 , Logan et al 1999 , Logan, Alba and Dill 2000 , Kasinitz et al 2004 A notable example is Stamps and Bohon's 2006 paper that finds high levels of educational completion among the adult second generation in emerging cities (whilst noting that this effect is probably something brought with them from other places in the US). Here, I make a foray into this field by focusing on the selectivity of 1) internal migration and 2) emerging immigrant state residence with regard to racial wage differences for immigrants, natives, and an adult second generation population. One reason for this approach is that it allows for comparative counterfactuals of immigrant location and mobility behavior to be assessed through 1) investigating whether those immigrants who undertake internal migration are those who benefit from doing so, and 2) suggesting hypothetical outcomes to residence in new immigrant locations rather than traditional ones, or vice versa.
Migration Selectivity and Spatial Assimilation
Whilst a considerable emphasis in the immigration literature is on the geographic concentration of immigrants in major U.S. cities, a related area of interest centers on the internal mobility patterns of immigrants and their descendants. This is in no small part because of association of dispersal from immigrant cities with immigrant progress, whether derived from an expanded-scale spatial assimilation suggestion that immigrants should move away from concentrated co-ethnic cities of original arrival in the U.S. such that their residential patterns mirror those of the U.S.-born population as they become more integrated (Bartel 1989, Kritz and Nogle 1994) , or from the related concern with immigrant cities as highly unequal places where immigrants are economically marginalized (Clark 2001 , Zhou 2001 ). This focus parallels that of a more classically human capital formulation that migration is selective of those who would stand to gain most from it. Interestingly, Vigdor As a result, it seems critical, given the ongoing interest in patterns of immigrant mobility and residence, to assess the relationship of internal mobility within the U.S. to immigrant wage outcomes. Put simply, is there a selectivity component to immigrant internal mobility in the U.S., such that those most likely to experience positive wage outcomes are those who undertake internal migration? If so, does it differ for immigrants and natives, and how? Would the foreign-born fare better if they moved? My interest in these questions stems in part from a realization of theoretical similarities in the assumptions of the economists' migration selectivity and the immigration sociologists' spatial assimilation models. Given regional inequalities across local labor markets, I suggest some of the uniformity of migration selectivity needs to be challenged with regard to the places between which it does (or does not) occur. In other words, the presumption that migrants are positively selected may not be geographically uniform since the characteristics that constitute selection within a wage distribution are context-specific. The emergence of immigrants in new states begs the question of whether there is selectivity to being in an emerging immigrant state versus a more traditional location. How does this choice happen and how does it matter? Are those who are in emerging states positively or negatively selected? And are there significant differences in the racial wage returns or penalties of those who are in new destinations?
Data and Methodology
In what follows, I report the results of a series of endogenous switching regression models assessing the effects of migration selectivity on logged hourly wages for native-born, foreignborn, and 1.5 generation i men and women, using data from the 2000 5% United States
Public Use Microdata Files (PUMS). In order to control for major differences between generation group in terms of age and employment profiles, I extract data on prime-age workers (25-54-year olds with active labor force status). The sample is further restricted to those who are currently employed, and who worked a minimum of 30 hours per week and 40 weeks last year. These models are attempts to answer two key questions: 1) whether immigrants' internal migration is positively selected for wages, and 2) whether emerging state residents' migrations are positively-selected with regard to wages. Each of the two sets of models also includes racial categories (discussed below) allowing for comparison of relative racial wage gaps. For comparison of intergenerational effects, I also include US-born individuals and the 1.5 generation adult children of immigrants. I expect that selectivity should increase across generations. Following both spatial assimilation and integration theories, the 1.5 generation should be theoretically less tied to an initial location than immigrants. Following human capital theories, their ability to gain wage rewards through locational choice should begin to approach that of the US-born. Extending these ideas to include locationally-specific racial wage gaps, the 1.5 generation should also be more able than the immigrant generation to use migration to escape places where the ethnic wage penalty may be particularly disadvantageous. In order to exclude the most recent immigrants, individuals are restricted to those who have been in the US for at least five year's time.
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Covariates include those commonly used in wage regressions: age (25-34, 35-44, and 45-54), education, and race. Since the majority of the significant variance in wages was captured by a dummy variable indicating whether an individual had a bachelor's degree or not, and since these models require somewhat parsimonious variable selection, "BA" is the only education variable. Race is grouped into broad categories of white, black, Asian, and Hispanic, iii with white as the reference category. Since race is a categorical variable, it is possible to evaluate selectivity's effect on racial wage differentials. In addition, the probit selection component of the models for the migration and emerging state dummies include the following covariates: new employment growth at destination (this is the increase in the labor force over a five-year period), family size, and median housing value. These two destination variables are measured at the level of the metropolitan area but clustered within states. Both destination characteristics are believed to attract migrants, while family size is considered a deterrent to migration. The migration selection variable measures whether an immigrant made a move between 1995 and 2000, at least at the scale of moving to a new metropolitan area (local within-neighborhood mobility is not included). The selection equation of this family of models (in this case the migration/location probits) must include covariates not present in the substantive equation of interest (in this case, the wage regressions) in order to avoid multicollinearity. Although many papers employing these models have found it difficult to justify this constraint theoretically, the analysis in this paper presents a compelling case for modeling place characteristics that should correlate with migration or location decisions somewhat separately from wage outcomes.
The inclusion of a dichotomous mover/nonmover covariate in a standard OLS wage regression is insufficient if it is believed that there exist 1) selectivity effects of observed wages for migrants (rather than potential migrants) and/or 2) endogeneity effects that associate a choice variable (like migration) with unmeasured variance in error terms associated with wages. In this case, if there were endogeneity in a series of unobserved variance related to migration choice (such that, for example), movers were more likely than a random individual to expect higher wages as a result of higher education, then their wages would be biased were no correction made for this choice (Vigdor 2002) .
Endogenous switching regression models address both endogeneity and selection concerns, and are appropriate when both the wage intercept and covariate coefficients are thought to vary with selection (Heckman et al 2000, Lokshin and Sajaia 2004) . Although selectivity models are thus normally used to account for measurement or sampling errors that can impede interpretation of treatment effects (such as migration) on outcome effects (such as wages), the variance in covariate estimates between models can also usefully be applied to interpret differences in how different groups experience the relationship between treatment and outcome. Thus, we can reasonably consider how the relationship between migration and localized structures of wage inequality might vary by race and nativity.
Results and Discussion
Endogenous switching regression models of internal migration (Table 1) and of emerging state residence (Table 2) are reported for foreign-stock and US-born men and women.
Separate parameters are estimated for 1.5 generation Asians and Hispanics but 1.5 generation whites and blacks are not separated from their immigrant co-ethnics as their numbers are relatively small.
I.
Internal Migration Selectivity Models <<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>> For each group, the wage regression models are reported as estimated for movers and nonmovers. The selection model follows, with the covariates in the migration probit reported.
Comparing the coefficients on a single covariate between the simultaneously-estimated mover and stayer equations shows the different relationship of that covariate to the log wage outcome. (Since wages are logged these can be interpreted in percentage changes.) Again, since race is a categorical variable, the wage estimates can be interpreted as the relative ethnic wage gap (here, with regard to white workers as the excluded reference group), and compared for movers and non-movers. Among the summary statistics at the bottom, r1
(rho) reports on the significance of the first equation (movers) being different from a random sample of the overall population, and r2 reports the same thing for the 2 nd equation
(non-movers).
There is indeed a large migration selectivity effect, as indicated by the positive coefficients on rho. Notably, the magnitude of rho is nearly doubled for the native-born population when compared with the foreign-stock population. After controlling for other covariates such as race, age, and education, the correlation between the residuals on characteristics of migration propensity relating to wages are considerably higher for the native-born. This is as expected, since immigrants' migration streams are considerably more economically focused than those of the native-born, and native-born migration streams are more efficient. The 1.5 generation falls somewhat in-between, indicating that their migration selectivity begins to approach that of the US-born. In each case, men's migration is more positively selected with regard to wages than women. This is consistent with gendered rewards in recruitment and hiring, and the intertwined processes of gender wage inequality, gendered labor force periodicity, and male employment-determined household migration (Cooke and Bailey 1996 , Withers and Clark 2007 , Cooke et al 2009 . Coefficients on other covariates are as expected, with a college degree exerting a strongly positive effect on wages, new employment growth at destination exhibiting a positive pull, and increasing family size exhibiting a deterrent effect as it limits mobility. Whites tend to fare better than other racial groups regardless of nativity, although 1.5 generation and native-born Asians (especially women) fare slightly better than their white counterparts. Still, there are interesting comparisons to be made across nativity groups and between the mover/stayer equations.
The large and significant effect of having a BA is much stronger for immigrants than for either native-born group, demonstrating either the very high returns to a college degree for immigrants, or the positive selectivity of immigrants coming to the US with these qualifications -since immigrants in aggregate have more polarized educational distributions than the native-born. Since this coefficient would be biased downward were it not for the selectivity parameter, this suggests that the wage benefits of higher education are exercised through internal migration by immigrants and the 1.5 generation as well as natives (and arguably to an even stronger extent). A college degree means far less for women in terms of wage rewards, as has been found previously in literature on tied movers (see, for example, Cooke and Bailey 1996) . Younger workers generally have much lower wages, and young immigrant workers (especially women) fare much worse relatively if they are not mobile. of nativity or gender -again pointing out that the negative wage penalty for being Hispanic (again the effect is less for male immigrant Hispanics than for all other Hispanic groups) can be abated by the process whereby some who can do better elsewhere choose to move. 1.5
generation Hispanic men fare much worse relative to whites if they do not move (by about 1/3), as do 1.5 Hispanic women. This is also true for other non-white groups, although black immigrant and Asian US-born women tend to fare better by staying put (mover/stayer differentials of -.06/-.02 and .07/.13, respectively). And Asians, who generally make wages that are at least as high as whites, fare relatively better by moving (again excepting US-born Asian women).
Overall, the important point about migration selectivity is that it is strong and positive for all groups, and that it tends to be a process through which Hispanics, Asian immigrants and some blacks evade racial wage penalties vis-à-vis whites (and some Asians increase their wage advantage through migration selectivity as well). As evidenced by the categorical coefficients, racial differences matter quite a bit more for immigrants than the 1.5 generation, and for the 1.5 generation than for the US-born (with the exception of US-born blacks) -and less for women than for men. To a certain extent, the 1.5 generation of all races and both genders evinces a hypermobility to the best options for evading the worst wage penalties in US labor markets.
II. Emerging state selectivity models <<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>>
While migration may be a way in which non-whites (especially immigrants) evade ethnic wage penalties, they are not doing it in (or by moving to) emerging immigrant states. Table 2 displays a second set of endogenous switching regression models -this time for a selection variable which attempts to determine if there is a selectivity effect to being in an emerging state. I have adapted Singer's "emerging, pre-emerging, and re-emerging" categories for metro areas here and applied them to states (choosing states with only emerging metros and excluding states which might have both old and new immigrant metros), as much of the discussion on new migrant destinations mentions the non-urban focus of this new settlement. Thus, the emerging states for the purpose of constructing the selection variable are Georgia, North Carolina, Nevada, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, Colorado, and Utah.
Even though these states were experiencing rapid growth in their immigrant populations, by 2000 2/3 of immigrants still lived in California, New York, New Jersey, Florida, Texas, and
Illinois (Singer 2004) . With these models, I attempt to determine if there is selectivity to residence in these emerging immigrant states. iv To clarify, as Table 1 reported on the selectivity of internal migration, Table 2 reports on the selectivity of residence in an emerging state (models of internal migration to emerging states had even stronger effects but are not reported here as that is only a subset of those in emerging immigration states). Table 2 can thus be interpreted similarly to Table 1 , with relative racial wage gaps or the payoff to a college degree being different for those in emerging immigrant states, and location selectivity displaying positive and negative effects net of the wage regressions.
Some general trends are worth noting. First, with regard to the youngest 25-34 year-old immigrant and 1.5 generation workers, they generally fare slightly better in emerging states than elsewhere. This is particularly important as some of these may have been children Among immigrant men, there are significant racial wage penalties to being non-white for all groups -worst for Hispanics (-.41 in emerging states), less so for blacks, and less so again for Asians. All of these are significantly stronger in emerging immigrant states. Whilst there are also significant racial wage penalties for non-white immigrant women, the locational differences are less important than they are for men (with the exception of Asian women for whom residence in an emerging state nearly doubles the wage penalty from 5-10%). The penalties overall are less severe for women immigrants than for men, but this finding suggests that some of the detrimental gender/wage effects of traditional immigrant geographies (Zhou and Logan 1989, Gilbertson 1996) are configured differently in newer locations. The rho coefficients are negative (but not significant) for residence in an emerging state (meaning that these samples may not statistically differ from a random sample), but very strongly and significantly positive for residence in a non-emerging state.
There is very positive wage selectivity associated with avoiding emerging state residence for all groups. (This effect is moderated in that older as well as continuous immigrant states are included in these analyses. It would be stronger still were only continuous immigrant states like New York, California, and Illinois used as the reference.)
The 1.5 generation evidences critical gender differences: Hispanic 1.5 generation men fare poorly regardless of location, but 1.5 generation women fare better in traditional immigrant locations, even after controlling for educational attainment. Although the racial wage penalties themselves attenuate somewhat by the 1.5 generation, much of the pattern still holds (and for 1.5 generation men, the negative selectivity coefficient rho1 on emerging state residence is strongly significant). This means that, despite cheaper housing costs, racial wage penalties are as likely to persist into the second generation in newly emerging states as elsewhere (and more so for women). For the 1.5 generation, the positive selectivity for residence elsewhere (rho2) is also much stronger -especially among women.
The persistence of racial locational effects is not tremendously surprising, given that racial penalties for even US-born blacks are stronger in emerging states, and similarly for Asians (even as they earn higher wages than whites they are higher yet in non-emerging states results simply from the fact that US-born white wages are on average much lower in these states. The important point is that regional selectivity patterns are generally and similarly negative throughout for emerging states and strongly positive for residing elsewhere, and especially for immigrants.
.
Conclusions
Although internal migration selectivity in the US is positive, workers who move are generally those who will fare better by doing so. That said, faring better as an individual migrant occurs with regard to other workers, and in unequal circumstances with regard to geography, education, gender, and race. A lack of mobility has detrimental consequences for the youngest workers and also for non-white groups -especially 1.5 generation non-whites and immigrant women. Non-white immigrant and 1.5 generation individuals who migrate evade some racial penalties vis-à-vis whites by virtue of migration selectivity, net of other characteristics of individuals and places. That said, they do not do so by being in or moving to emerging immigrant states, which evidence strongly negative selectivity with regard to wages. Racial penalties to non-whites are substantial in these states, and the selectivity effect of this is stronger yet for the 1.5 generation. These models suggest the need for further investigation of the unequally-configured geographies of these newer immigrant locations, and of how internal migration interacts with wage inequality more generally. The emergence of new immigrant geographies alongside the maturation of the second generation provides an opportunity to move such discussions beyond the theoretical and empirical constraints of migration selectivity and spatial assimilation models (constructed to conceptualize immigrant inequality with regard to spatial concentration). ii This excludes many of the most recent immigrants to new immigrant destinations in the US, but is a necessary exclusion as these individuals have had no time to adapt to the US and often have very low wages. This selection is also at the heart of the different findings (Singer 2004 vs. Stamps and Bohon 2006) comparing the education of immigrants in new destinations to those in more traditional immigrant locations.
iii For individuals indicating more than 1 race, with 1 race being white, they were coded in the non-white racial category. All other multi-racial individuals (ie Asian-blacks) were coded in an "other" category. These were dropped from the final models due to very low cell counts.
iv In a second set of models -not reported here but with similar and stronger effects -I limit the sample to movers only in order to test the selectivity of those choosing emerging immigrant states over other states through secondary migration.
